For many years, executives being laid off from major corporations have been offered so-called golden parachutes, generous severance packages designed to ensure that no management personnel goes away angry or impoverished because the company has fallen on hard times. These multi-million dollar arrangements drew widespread criticism because rank and file workers were often given little more than 2 weeks notice when their contracts were terminated.
Those days are over.
The Ford Motor Company - since its creation a pioneer in labor relations - has once again bucked the trend, this time by offering generous optional buyouts to some 75,000 hourly workers as it downsizes.
Ford has been hit hard by competition in the U.S. market, and in an effort to cut costs and slough off unneeded capacity, it has started closing plants. Many feared that these firings would mean financial ruin for thousands of workers, particularly those who were approaching retirement and were too old to relocate and find new work. Without getting into the structure of the buyout program, the bottom line is that Ford has been able to significantly downsize without leaving families in the gutter. In fact, many workers were positively ecstatic about the opportunity to go back to school or start their own business with the money and support they received from Ford.
Downsizing is a serous challenge for any large organization. People plan their lives around their jobs, and pulling the rug out from under thousands of families can have effects that ripple across the economy. Moreover, the political and commercial consequences of such decisions are such that many organizations continue to operate with large numbers of obsolete or unnecessary workers rather than face the media firestorm.
In my opinion, our beloved government is one such organization. It is the nation’s largest employer with something like 20 million Americans on the payroll at the local state and federal levels. Despite labor saving information technologies and the rise of private firms offering to perform traditional government services for profit, the size of the government has continued to swell.
Even the most “small government” administrations have proved incapable of popping this pimple because firing people is just plain unpopular. We have entered an era when government not only provides public goods but also secure jobs paid with public funds. This “make work” mission, largely a product of the New Deal, has infected our civil service corps with a sense of entitlement instead of a sense of responsibility.
I believe that job security and just compensation are important to attract the best people to government, but when it becomes impossible restructure the public workforce, political reform itself becomes impossible.
This idea of the “silver parachute,” selective, attractive, optional buyouts that leave both workers and taxpayers better off, may be a powerful tool to enact the kinds of public sector reforms that our country so obviously needs.
When it comes to governments, that which does not evolve is dying.
Thursday
Friday
History II
The document posted below was found in stack of papers from the U.S. Army General Staff, and although it was probably written sometime during 1944, I rather wish it had been circulated in 2003 as the country prepared to invade Iraq. Many of the observations could apply verbatim to our current ill-fated war.
I challenge you, oh my loyal readers, to provide a single historical example of a foreign army conquering another on its home soil only to be greeted as liberators. I don't care how bad the regime was, that's just not how human beings work, particularly when you consider that a sizeable group profited enormously from the corrupt regime. Most of Iraq may be happy the old bastard is gone, but to believe that they would treat us as anything but the occupying force we are is insane.
We were simply unprepared for the demands of a full scale occupation. The initial disorder, looting, reprisals and the subsequent insurgency were utterly foreseeable, and in fact were foreseen by the planners that Rumsfeld and his deputies dutifully ignored.
As I stood in the audience of a rock concert last week and turned to notice Paul Wolfowitz standing beside me in all his portly glory, I was torn between the desire to engage him in a knock down drag out debate on foreign policy or give him a big sloppy Wet Willy for his foolishness. Then I remembered that he probably had security with him.
I challenge you, oh my loyal readers, to provide a single historical example of a foreign army conquering another on its home soil only to be greeted as liberators. I don't care how bad the regime was, that's just not how human beings work, particularly when you consider that a sizeable group profited enormously from the corrupt regime. Most of Iraq may be happy the old bastard is gone, but to believe that they would treat us as anything but the occupying force we are is insane.
We were simply unprepared for the demands of a full scale occupation. The initial disorder, looting, reprisals and the subsequent insurgency were utterly foreseeable, and in fact were foreseen by the planners that Rumsfeld and his deputies dutifully ignored.
As I stood in the audience of a rock concert last week and turned to notice Paul Wolfowitz standing beside me in all his portly glory, I was torn between the desire to engage him in a knock down drag out debate on foreign policy or give him a big sloppy Wet Willy for his foolishness. Then I remembered that he probably had security with him.
Wednesday
What was that thing about history repeating itself?
My weekly trip to the National Archive in College Park, MD turned up this document:
SECRET
The Secretary of War after reading the following memo commented "this is a remarkably good paper" and directed that it be circulated.
Memorandum For:
Subject: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy Toward Japan
1. To be realistic, post hostilities policy toward Japan must be based upon:
a. Recognition of the probable reaction of the American public over a period of time. A policy which does not win the continuing support of the American public is doomed to failure.
b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.
2. The most important points to be noted in connection with a and b above would appear to be the following:
a. The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.
b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either EXTENDING AND TIGHTENING CONTROL OR WITHDRAWING WITHOUT accomplishing THE DESIRED OBJECTIVES.
c. The conquering nation CANNOT IMPOSE ITS FORM OF GOVERNMENT, IDEALS OR WAY OF LIFE EXCEPT BY PERMANENT MILITARY OCCUPATION AND IMMIGRATION.
3. The formulation of our policies toward post hostilities Japan, therefore, requires the highest degree of statesmanship. We must look forward as well as backward. We must:
a. Avoid to the maximum extent possible policies dictated by current war hysteria which subsequently the American public will repudiate or which will involve commitments which the American public will be unwilling to fulfill.
b. Attempt to accomplish the maximum degree of progress towards the regeneration of Japan in the minimum amount of time. Our degree of success in accomplishing this objective will depend upon the intelligence with which we approach the problem of the relations between victor and vanquished.
...
5.b. Allied Mlitary Gvernment is bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and inefficient. We must give full recognition to the fact that we do not have sufficient personnel with the proper vision training and ability to carry out the task effectively.
(caps mine)
SECRET
The Secretary of War after reading the following memo commented "this is a remarkably good paper" and directed that it be circulated.
Memorandum For:
Subject: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy Toward Japan
1. To be realistic, post hostilities policy toward Japan must be based upon:
a. Recognition of the probable reaction of the American public over a period of time. A policy which does not win the continuing support of the American public is doomed to failure.
b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.
2. The most important points to be noted in connection with a and b above would appear to be the following:
a. The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.
b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either EXTENDING AND TIGHTENING CONTROL OR WITHDRAWING WITHOUT accomplishing THE DESIRED OBJECTIVES.
c. The conquering nation CANNOT IMPOSE ITS FORM OF GOVERNMENT, IDEALS OR WAY OF LIFE EXCEPT BY PERMANENT MILITARY OCCUPATION AND IMMIGRATION.
3. The formulation of our policies toward post hostilities Japan, therefore, requires the highest degree of statesmanship. We must look forward as well as backward. We must:
a. Avoid to the maximum extent possible policies dictated by current war hysteria which subsequently the American public will repudiate or which will involve commitments which the American public will be unwilling to fulfill.
b. Attempt to accomplish the maximum degree of progress towards the regeneration of Japan in the minimum amount of time. Our degree of success in accomplishing this objective will depend upon the intelligence with which we approach the problem of the relations between victor and vanquished.
...
5.b. Allied Mlitary Gvernment is bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and inefficient. We must give full recognition to the fact that we do not have sufficient personnel with the proper vision training and ability to carry out the task effectively.
(caps mine)
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