My weekly trip to the National Archive in College Park, MD turned up this document:
SECRET
The Secretary of War after reading the following memo commented "this is a remarkably good paper" and directed that it be circulated.
Memorandum For:
Subject: Observations on Post Hostilities Policy Toward Japan
1. To be realistic, post hostilities policy toward Japan must be based upon:
a. Recognition of the probable reaction of the American public over a period of time. A policy which does not win the continuing support of the American public is doomed to failure.
b. Recognition of the lessons taught by history with respect to relations between the conqueror and the conquered.
2. The most important points to be noted in connection with a and b above would appear to be the following:
a. The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.
b. Even under the most just and equitable administration, resentment against a conquering nation exercising direct political and military control over a vanquished nation inevitably tends to increase over a period of time. Difficulties arise which present the ruling nation with the alternative of either EXTENDING AND TIGHTENING CONTROL OR WITHDRAWING WITHOUT accomplishing THE DESIRED OBJECTIVES.
c. The conquering nation CANNOT IMPOSE ITS FORM OF GOVERNMENT, IDEALS OR WAY OF LIFE EXCEPT BY PERMANENT MILITARY OCCUPATION AND IMMIGRATION.
3. The formulation of our policies toward post hostilities Japan, therefore, requires the highest degree of statesmanship. We must look forward as well as backward. We must:
a. Avoid to the maximum extent possible policies dictated by current war hysteria which subsequently the American public will repudiate or which will involve commitments which the American public will be unwilling to fulfill.
b. Attempt to accomplish the maximum degree of progress towards the regeneration of Japan in the minimum amount of time. Our degree of success in accomplishing this objective will depend upon the intelligence with which we approach the problem of the relations between victor and vanquished.
...
5.b. Allied Mlitary Gvernment is bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and inefficient. We must give full recognition to the fact that we do not have sufficient personnel with the proper vision training and ability to carry out the task effectively.
(caps mine)
